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Abstract
We consider a firm that sells a large number of products to its customers in an online
fashion. Each product is described by a high dimensional feature vector, and the market value
of a product is assumed to be linear in the values of its features. Parameters of the valuation
model are unknown and can change over time. The firm sequentially observes a product’s
features and can use the historical sales data (binary sale/no sale feedbacks) to set the price
of current product, with the objective of maximizing the collected revenue. We measure the
performance of a dynamic pricing policy via regret, which is the expected revenue loss compared
to a clairvoyant that knows the sequence of model parameters in advance.
We propose a pricing policy based on projected stochastic gradient descent (PSGD) and
characterize its regret in terms of time T , features dimension d, and the temporal variability
in the model parameters, δt. We consider two settings. In the first one, feature vectors are
chosen antagonistically by nature and we prove that the regret of PSGD pricing policy is of
order O(
√
T +
∑T
t=1
√
tδt). In the second setting (referred to as stochastic features model), the
feature vectors are drawn independently from an unknown distribution. We show that in this
case, the regret of PSGD pricing policy is of order O(d2 log T +
∑T
t=1 tδt/d).
1 Introduction
Motivated by the prevalence of online marketplaces, we consider the problem of a firm selling a
large number of products, that are significantly differentiated from each other, to customers that
arrive over time. The firm needs to price the products in a dynamic manner, with the objective of
maximizing the expected revenue.
The majority of work in dynamic pricing assume that a retailer sells identical items to its
customers [BZ09, FVR10, BR12, dBZ13, WDY14]. Recently, feature-based models have been used
to model the products differentiation by assuming that each product is described by vectors of
high-dimensional features. These models are suitable for business settings where there are an
enormous number of distinct products. One important example is online ad markets. In this
context, products are the impressions (user view) that are sold by the web publisher to advertisers.
Due to the ever-growing amount of data that is available on the Internet, for each impression there
is large number of associated features, including demographic information, browsing history of the
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user, and context of the webpage. Many other online markets, such as Airbnb, eBay and Etsy also
have a similar setting in which products to be sold are highly differentiated. For example, in the
case of Aribnb, the products are “stays” and each is characterized by a large number of features
including space properties, location, amenities, house rules, as well as arrival dates, events in the
area, availability of near-by hotels, etc [Air15].
Here, we consider a feature-based model that postulates a linear relation between the market
value of each product and its feature values. Further, from the firm’s perspective, we treat distinct
buyers independently, and hereafter focus on a single buyer. Put it formally, we start with the
following model for the buyer’s valuation:
v(xt) = 〈xt, θ〉+ zt , (1)
where xt ∈ Rd denotes the product feature vector, θ represents the buyer’s preferences and zt,
t ≥ 1 are idiosyncratic shocks, referred to as noise, which are drawn independently and identically
from a zero mean distribution. For two vectors a, b, we write 〈a, b〉 to refer to their inner product.
Feature vectors xt are observable, while model parameter θ is a-priori unknown to the firm (seller).
Therefore, the buyer’s valuation v(xt) is also hidden from the firm.
Parameters of the above model represents how different features are weighted by the buyer in
assessing the product. Considering such model, a firm can use historical sales data to estimate
parameters of the valuation model, while concurrently collecting revenue from new sales. In prac-
tice, though, the buyer’s valuation of a product will change over time and this raises the concern
of perishability of sales data.
In order to capture this point, we consider a richer model with varying coefficients:
vt(xt) = 〈xt, θt〉+ zt . (2)
Model parameters θt may change over time and as a result, valuation of a product depends on both
the product feature vector and the time index.
We study a dynamic pricing problem, where at each time period t, the firm has a product to
sell and after observing the product feature vector xt, posts a price pt. If the buyer’s valuation is
above the posted price, vt(xt) ≥ pt, a sale occurs and the firm collects a revenue of pt. If the posted
price exceeds the buyer’s valuation, pt > vt(xt), no sale occurs. Note that at each step, the firm
has access to the previous feedbacks (sale/no sale) from the buyer and can use this information in
setting the current price.
In this paper, we will analyze the varying-coefficient model (2) and answer two fundamental
questions:
First, what is the value of knowing the sequence of model parameters θt; in other
words, what is the expected revenue loss (regret) compared to the clairvoyant policy
that knows the parameters of the valuation model in advance? Second, what is a good
pricing policy?
The answer to the first question intrinsically depends on the temporal variability in the sequence
θt. If this variation is very large, then there is not much that can be learnt from previous feedback
on the buyer’s behavior and the problem turns into a random price experimentation. On the other
hand, if all of the parameters θt are the same, then this feedback information can be used to learn
the model parameters, which in turn helps in setting the future prices. In this case, an algorithm
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that performs a good balance between price exploration and best-guess pricing (exploitation) can
lead to a small regret. In this work, we study this trade-off through a projected stochastic gradient
descent algorithm and investigate the effect of variations of the sequence of θt on the regret bounds.
Feature-based models have recently attracted interest in dynamic pricing. [ARS14] studied
a similar model to (1) (without the noise terms zt), where the features xt are drawn from an
unknown i.i.d distribution. A pricing strategy was proposed based on stochastic gradient descent,
which results in a regret of the form O(T 2/3
√
log T ). This work also studied the problem of
dynamic incentive compatibility in repeated posted-price auctions. Subsequently, [CLPL16] studied
model (1), wherein the feature vectors xt are chosen antagonistically by nature and not sampled i.i.d.
This work proposes a pricing policy based on the ellipsoid method from convex optimization [BV04]
with a regret bound of O(d2 log(T/d)), under a low-noise setting. More accurately, the regret scales
as O(d2 log(min{T/d, 1/δ}) + dδT ), where δ measures the noise magnitude: in case of bounded
noise, δ represents the uniform bound on noise and in case of gaussian noise with variance σ2, it is
defined as δ = 2σ
√
log(T ). In [LLV16], the regret bound of this policy was improved to O(d log T ),
under the noiseless setting. In [JN16], authors study and highlight the role of the structure of
demand curve in dynamic pricing. They introduce model (1), and assume that the feature vectors
xt are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. Further, motivated by real-world applications,
it is assumed that the parameter vector θ is sparse in the sense that only a few of its entries are
nonzero. A regularized log-likelihood approach is taken to get an improved regret bound of order
s0(log(d)+ log(T )). We add to this body of work by considering feature-based models for valuation
of products whose parameters vary over time.
Time-varying demand environments have also been studied recently by [KZ16]. Explicitly, they
consider a firm that sells one type of product to customers that arrive over a time horizon. After
setting price pt, the firm observes demand Dt given by Dt = αt + βtpt + t, where αt, βt ∈ R are
the unknown parameters of the demand model and t are the unobserved demand shocks (noise).
By contrast, in this work we consider different products, each characterized by a high-dimensional
feature vector. Further, the seller only receives a binary feedback (sale/no sale) of the customer’s
behavior at each step, rather than observing the customer’s valuation.
1.1 Organization of paper and our main contributions
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formally define the model
and formulate the problem. Technical assumptions and the notion of regret will be discussed in this
section. We next propose a pricing policy based on projected stochastic gradient descent (PSGD)
applied to the log-likelihood function. At each time period t, it returns an estimate θ̂t. The price pt
is then set to the optimal price as if θ̂t was the actual parameter θt. We next analyze the regret of
our PSGD algorithm. Let δt = ‖θt+1−θt‖ be the variation in model parameters at time period t. In
Section 3.1, we consider the setting where the product feature vectors xt are chosen antagonistically
by nature and show that the regret of PSGD algorithm is of order O(
√
T+
∑T
t=1
√
tδt). Interestingly,
this bound is independent of the dimension d, which is a desirable property of our policy for high-
dimensional applications. We next, in Section 4, consider a stochastic features model, where the
feature vectors xt are drawn independently from an unknown distribution (cf. Assumption 4.1).
Under this setting, we show that the regret of PSGD is of order O(d2 log T +
∑T
t=1 tδt/d). Note that
setting δt = 0 corresponds to model (1) and our PSGD pricing obtains a logarithmic regret in T .
Section 7 is devoted to the proof of main theorems and the main lemmas are proved in Section 8.
Finally, proof of several technical steps are deferred to Appendices.
3
1.2 Related literature
Our works is at the intersection of dynamic pricing, online optimization and high-dimensional
statistics. In the following, we briefly discuss the work most related to ours from these contexts.
Feature-based dynamic pricing. Recent papers on dynamic pricing consider models with fea-
tures/covariates, motivated in part by new advances in big data technology that allow firms to col-
lect large amount of fine-grained information. In the introduction, we discussed the work [ARS14,
JN16, CLPL16] which are closely related to our setting. Another recent work on feature-based
dynamic pricing is [QB16]. In this work, authors consider a model where the seller observes the
demand entirely, rather than a binary feedback as in our setting. A greedy iterative least squares
(GILS) algorithm is proposed that at each time period estimates the demand as a linear function
of price by applying least squares to the set of prior prices and realized demands. The work un-
derscores the role of feature-based approaches and show that they create enough price dispersion
to achieve a regret of O(log(T )). This is closely related to the work of [dBZ13] and [KZ14] in dy-
namic pricing (without demand covariates) that demonstrate the GILS is suboptimal and propose
methods to integrate forced price-dispersion with GILS to achieve optimal regret.
Online optimization. This field offers a variety of tools for sequential prediction, where an agent
measures its predictive performance according to a series of convex functions. Specifically, there is
a sequence of a priori unknown reward functions f1, f2, f3, . . . and an agent must make a sequence
of decisions: at each time period t, he selects a point zt and a loss ft(zt) is incurred. Note that the
function ft is not known to agent at step t, but he has access to all previous functions f1, . . . , ft−1.
First order methods, like online gradient descent (OGD) or online mirror descent (OMD) only use
the gradient of previous function at the selected points, i.e., ∂ft(zt). The notion of regret here is
defined by comparing the agent with the best fixed comparator [SS11].
[HW15] proposed dynamic mirror descent that is capable of adapting adapts to a possibly non-
stationary environment. In contrast to OMD [BT03, SS11], the notion of regret is defined more
generally with respect to the best comparator “sequence”.
It is worth noting that the general framework of online learning does not directly apply to
our problem. To see this, we define the the loss ft to be the negative of the revenue obtained in
time period t, i.e., ft = −ptI(pt ≥ vt). Then 1) the loss functions are not convex; 2) the (first
order information) of previous loss functions depend on the corresponding valuations v1, . . . , vt−1
which are never revealed to the seller. That said, we borrow some of the techniques from online
optimization in proving our results. (See proof of Lemma 3.2.)
High-dimensional statistics. Among the work in this area, perhaps the most related one to
our setting is the problem of 1-bit compressed sensing [PV13a, PV13b, ALPV14, BJ15]. In this
problem, a set of linear measurements are taken from an unknown vector and the goal is to recover
this vector having access to the sign of these measurements (1-bit information). This is related to
the dynamic pricing problem on model (1), as the seller observes 1-bit feedback (sale/no sale from
previous time periods). However, there are a few important differences between these two problem
that are worth noting: 1) In dynamic pricing, the crux of the matter is the decisions (prices)
made by the firm. Of course this task entails learning the model parameters and therefore the
firm gets into the realm of exploration (learning) and exploitation (earning revenue). By contrast,
1-bit compressed sensing is only a learning task; 2) In dynamic pricing, the prices are set based
on the previous (sale/no sale) feedbacks. Therefore, the feedbacks are inherently correlated and
this makes the learning task challenging. However, in 1-bit compressed sensing it is assumed that
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the measurements (and therefore the observed signs ) are independent; 3) The majority of work
on 1-bit compressed sensing consider an offline setting, while in the dynamic pricing, decision are
made in an online manner.
2 Model
We consider a pricing problem faced by a firm that sells products in a sequential manner. At each
time period t = 1, 2, · · · , T the firm has a product to sell and the product is represented by an
observable vector of features (covariates) xt ∈ X ⊆ Rd. The length of the time horizon, denoted by
T , is unknown the to the firm and the set X is bounded.
The product at time t has a market value vt = vt(xt), depending on both t and xt, which is
unobservable. At each period t, the firm (seller) posts a price pt. If pt ≤ vt, a sale occurs, and the
firm collects revenue pt. If the price is set higher than the market value, pt > vt, no sale occurs
and no revenue is generated. The goal of the firm is to design a pricing policy that maximizes the
collected revenue.
We assume that the market value of a product is a linear function of its covariates, namely
vt(xt) = 〈θt, xt〉+ zt . (3)
Here, θt and xt are d-dimensional and {zt}t≥1 are idiosyncratic shocks, referred to as noise, which
are drawn independently and identically from a zero-mean distribution over R. We denote its
cumulative distribution function by F , and the corresponding density by f(x) = F ′(x). Note that
the noise can account for the features that are not measured. We refer to [KZ14, dBZ14, QB16]
for a similar notion of demand shocks.
The sequence of parameters θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . ) is unknown to the firm and they may vary across
time. This paper focuses on arbitrary sequences θ and propose an efficient algorithm whose regret
scale gracefully in time and the temporal variability in the sequences of θt. The regret is measured
with respect to the clairvoyant policy that knows the sequence θ in advance. We will formally
define the regret in Section 2.2.
We let yt be the response variable that indicates whether a sale has occurred at period t:
yt =
{
+1 if vt ≥ pt ,
−1 if vt < pt .
(4)
Note that the above model for yt can be represented as the following probabilistic model:
yt =
{
+1 with probability 1− F (pt − 〈θt, xt〉) ,
−1 with probability F (pt − 〈θt, xt〉)
(5)
2.1 Technical assumptions and notations
For a vector v, we write ‖v‖p for the standard `p norm of a vector v, i.e., ‖v‖p = (
∑
i |vi|p)1/p.
Whenever the subscript p is not mentioned it is deemed as the `2 norm. For a matrix A, ‖A‖
denotes its `2 operator norm. For two vectors a, b, we use the notation 〈a, b〉 to refer to their inner
product.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that ‖xt‖ ≤ 1, for all xt ∈ X , and ‖θt‖ ≤ W for a
known constant W . We denote by Θ the d-dimensional `2 ball of radius W (In fact, we can take Θ
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to be any convex set that contains parameters θt. The size of Θ effects our regret bounds up to a
constant factor.)
We also make the following assumption on the distribution of noise F .
Assumption 2.1. The function F (v) is strictly increasing. Further, F (v) and 1 − F (v) are log-
concave in v.
Log-concavity is a widely-used assumption in the economics literature [BB05]. Note that if
the density f is symmetric and the distribution F is log-concave, then 1 − F is also log-concave.
Assumption 2.1 is satisfied by several common probability distributions including normal, uniform,
Laplace, exponential, and logistic. Note that the cumulative distribution function of all log-concave
densities is also log-concave [BV04].
We use the standard big-O notation. In particular f(n) = O(g(n)) if there exists a constant
C > 0 such that |f(n)| ≤ Cg(n) for all n large enough. We also use R≥0 to refer to the set of
non-negative real-valued numbers.
2.2 Benchmark policy and regret minimization
For a pricing policy, we measures its performance via the notion of regret, which is the expected
revenue loss compared to an oracle that knows the sequence of model parameters in advance (but
not the realizations of {zt}t≥1).We first characterize this benchmark policy.
Using Eq. (3), the expected revenue from a posted price p is equal to p × P(vt ≥ p) = p(1 −
F (p− θt · xt)). First order condition for the optimal price p∗(xt, θt) reads
p∗(xt, θt) =
1− F (p∗(xt, θt)− 〈θt, xt〉)
f (p∗(xt, θt)− 〈θt, xt〉) . (6)
To lighten the notation, we drop the arguments xt, θt and denote by p
∗
t the optimal price at time t.
We next recall the virtual valuation function, commonly used in mechanism design [Mye81]:
ϕ(v) ≡ v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
.
Writing Eq. (6) in terms of function ϕ, we get
〈θt, xt〉+ ϕ (p∗t − 〈θt, xt〉) = 0 .
In order to solve for p∗t , we define the pricing function g as follows:
g(v) ≡ v + ϕ−1(−v) . (7)
By Assumption 2.1, ϕ is injective and hence g is well-defined. Further, it is easy to verify that g is
non-negative. Using the definition of g and rearranging the terms we obtain
p∗t = g(〈θt, xt〉) . (8)
The performance metric we use in this paper is the worst-case regret with respect to a clairvoyant
policy that knows the sequence θ in advance. Formally, for a policy pi to be the seller’s policy that
sets price pt at period t, the worst-case regret is defined over T periods is defined as:
Regretpi(T ) ≡ sup {∆piθ,x : θt ∈ Θ, xt ∈ X} , (9)
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PSGD (Projected stochastic gradient descent) pricing policy
Input: (at time 0) function g, set Θ,
Input: (arrives over time) covariate vectors {xt}t∈N
Output: prices {pt}t∈N
1: p1 ← 0 and initialize θ̂1 ∈ Θ
2: for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
3: Set θ̂t+1 according to the following rule:
θ̂t+1 = ΠΘ(θ̂t − ηt∇`t(θ̂t)) (11)
with
`t(θ) = −I(yt = 1) log(1− F (pt − 〈xt, θ〉))− I(yt = −1) log(F (pt − 〈xt, θ〉)) (12)
4: Set price pt+1 as
pt+1 ← g(〈xt+1, θ̂t+1〉) (13)
where for T ≥ 1, θ = (θ1, . . . , θT ) and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xT ),
∆piθ,x(T ) = Eθ,x
[
T∑
t=1
(
p∗t I(vt ≥ p∗t )− ptI(vt ≥ pt)
)]
. (10)
Here the expectation Eθ,x is with respect to the distributions of idiosyncratic noise, zt. Note that
vt, pt, and p
∗
t depend on θ and x.
3 Pricing policy
Our dynamic pricing policy consists of a projected gradient descent algorithm to predict pa-
rameters θ̂t. With each new product, it computes the negative gradient of the loss and shirts its
prediction in that direction. The result is projected onto set Θ to produce the next prediction. The
policy then sets the prices as pt = g(〈xt, θ̂t〉). Note that by Eq. (7), pt is the optimal price if θ̂t
was the true parameter θt. Also, by log-concavity assumption on F and 1 − F , the function `t(θ)
is convex.
In projected gradient descent, the sequence of step sizes {ηt}t≥1 is an arbitrary sequence of non-
increasing values. In Sections 3.1 and 4, we analyze the regret of our pricing policy and provide
guidelines for choosing step sizes.
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3.1 Regret analysis
We first define a few useful quantities that appear in our regret bounds. Define
M ≡ W + ϕ−1(0) , (14)
uM ≡ sup
|x|≤M
{
max
{
− d
dx
logF (x),− d
dx
log(1− F (x))
}}
, (15)
`M ≡ inf|x|≤M
{
min
{
− d
2
dx2
logF (x),− d
2
dx2
log(1− F (x))
}}
, (16)
where the derivatives are with respect to x. We note that M is an upper-bound on the maximum
price offered and also, by the log-concavity property of F and 1− F , we have
uM = max
{
− d
dx
logF (−M),− d
dx
log(1− F (M))
}
.
Further, by log-concavity property of F and 1− F , we have `M > 0.
We also let B = maxv f(v) and B
′ = maxv f ′(v), respectively denote the maximum value of the
density function f and the its derivative f ′.
The following theorem bounds the regret of our PSGD policy.
Theorem 3.1. Consider model (3) for the product market values and let Assumption 2.1 hold.
Set M = 2W + ϕ−1(0), with ϕ being the virtual valuation function w.r.t distribution F . Then, the
regret of PSGD pricing policy using a non-increasing sequence of step sizes {ηt}t≥1 is bounded as
follows:
Regret(T ) ≤ 2(2B +MB
′)
`M
max
{
16
`M
log T,
2W 2
ηT+1
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
}
+
M
T
, (17)
where δt ≡ ‖θt+1 − θt‖.
In particular, if ηt ∝ 1√t , then there exists a constant C = C(B,M,W, `M , uM ) > 0, independent
of T , such that
Regret(T ) ≤ C
(√
T +
T∑
t=1
√
tδt
)
. (18)
At the core of our regret analysis (proof of Theorem 3.1) is the following Lemma that provides
a prediction error bound for the customer’s valuations.
Lemma 3.2. Consider model (3) for the product market values and let Assumption 2.1 hold. Set
M = 2W + ϕ−1(0), with ϕ being the virtual valuation function w.r.t distribution F . Let {θ̂t}t≥1
be generated by PSGC pricing policy, using a non-increasing positive series ηt+1 ≤ ηt. Then, with
probability at least 1− 1
T 2
the following holds true:
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 ≤ 4
`M
max
{
16
`M
log T,
2W 2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
( 1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 + u
2
M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
}
,
(19)
where uM , `M are given by Equations (15), (16), respectively.
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Lemma 3.2 is presented in a form that can also be used in proving our next results under the
stochastic features model. For proving Theorem 3.1, we simplify bound (19) as follows. Given that
θt+1, θ̂t+1 ∈ Θ, we have ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖ ≤ 2W . Using the non-increasing property of sequence ηt, we
write
2W 2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
(
1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 ≤ 2W
2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
(
2W 2
ηt+1
− 2W
2
ηt
)
≤ 2W
2
ηT+1
.
Therefore, bound (19) simplifies to:
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 ≤ 4
`M
max
{
16
`M
log T,
2W 2
ηT+1
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
}
, (20)
The regret bound (17) is derived by relating regret at each time period to the prediction error at
that time. We refer to Section 7 for the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.3. The regret bound (17) does not depend on the dimension d, which makes our pricing
policy desirable for high-dimensional applications. Also, note that the temporal variation δt appears
in our bound with coefficient
√
t. Therefore, variations at later times are more impactful on the
regret of PSGD pricing policy. This is expected because at later times, the pricing policy is more
relied on the accumulated information about the valuation model and an abrupt change in the
model parameters can make this information worthless. On the other side, temporal changes at
the beginning steps are not that effective since the policy is still experimenting different prices to
learn the customer’s behavior.
Remark 3.4. While the regret bound is dimension-free, the computational complexity of PSGD
pricing policy scales with dimension d. Specifically, the complexity of each step is O(d). To see this,
we note that the gradient ∇`t(θ) can be computed in O(d) by Equations (70) and (71). Projection
onto set Θ (`2 projection) is also O(d).
4 Stochastic features model
In Theorem 3.1, we showed that our PSGD pricing policy achieves regret of order O(
√
T +∑T
t=1
√
tδt). Let us point out that in Theorem 3.1 the arrivals (feature vectors xt) are modeled as
adversarial. In this section, we assume that features xt are independent and identically distributed
according to a probability distribution on Rd. Under such stochastic model, we show that the regret
of PSGD pricing scales at most of order O(d2 log T +
∑T
t=1 tδt/d).
We proceed by formally defining the stochastic features model.
Assumption 4.1. (Stochastic features model). Feature vectors xt are generated independently
according to a probability distribution Px, with a bounded support in Rd. We denote by Σ the
covariance matrix of distribution Px and assume that Σ has bounded eigenvalues. Specifically,
there exist constants Cmin and Cmax such that for every eigenvalue σ of Σ, we have 0 <
1
dCmin ≤
σ < 1dCmax.
Without loss of generality and to simplify the presentation, we assume that Px is supported on
the unit `2 ball in Rd. The rationale behind the above assumption on the scaling of eigenvalues
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is that Trace(Σ) = E(‖xt‖2) ≤ 1. Therefore, the assumption above on the eigenvalues of Σ states
that all the eigenvalues are of the same order.
Under the stochastic features model, we define the notion of worst-case regret as follows. For a
policy pi be the seller’s policy that sets price pt at period t, the T -period regret is defined as:
Regretpi(T ) ≡ sup {∆piθ,Px : θt ∈ Θ, Px ∈ Q} , (21)
where Q denotes the set of probability distribution supported on `2 unit ball satisfying Assump-
tion 4.1 (bounded eigenvalues). Further, for T ≥ 1, θ = (θ1, . . . , θT ) and probability measure Px,
we define
∆piθ,Px(T ) = Eθ,Px
[
T∑
t=1
(
p∗t I(vt ≥ p∗t )− ptI(vt ≥ pt)
)]
. (22)
where the expectation is with respect to the distributions of idiosyncratic noise, zt, and Px, the
distribution of feature vectors. Note the subtle difference with definition (9), in that the worst case
is computed over Q rather than X .
We propose a similar PSGD pricing policy for this setting, with a specific choice of the step
sizes. Ideally, we want to set ηt = 6/(`MCt), where C is an arbitrary fixed constant such that
0 < C < σmin, with σmin being the minimum eigenvalue of population covariance Σ. Of course,
Σ is unknown and therefore we proceed as follows. We let Qt = (1/t)
∑t
`=1 x`x
T
` be the empirical
covariance based on the first t features. Denote by σt the minimum eigenvalue of Qt. We then use
the sequence σt, and set the step size ηt as
ηt =
1
λt · t , λt =
`M
6
{
1
t
(
1 +
t∑
`=1
σ`
)}
.
Description of the PSGD pricing policy is given in Table above.
4.1 Logarithmic regret bound
The following theorem bounds the regret of our dynamics pricing policy.
Theorem 4.2. Consider model (3) for the product market values and suppose Assumption 2.1
holds. Let M = 2W + ϕ−1(0), with ϕ being the virtual valuation function w.r.t distribution F .
Under the stochastic features model (Assumption 4.1), the regret of PSGD pricing policy is bounded
as follows:
Regret(T ) ≤ C1d2 log T + C2
T∑
t=1
t
d
δt , (28)
where δt ≡ ‖θt+1 − θt‖ and C1, C2 are constants that depend on Cmax, Cmin, uM , `M ,M,B,W but
are independent of dimension d.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 relies on the following lemma that is analogous to Lemma 3.2 and estab-
lishes a prediction error bound for the customer’s valuations.
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PSGD pricing policy for stochastic features model
Input: (at time 0) function g, set Θ,
Input: (arrives over time) covariate vectors {xt}t∈N
Output: prices {pt}t∈N
1: p1 ← 0 and initialize θ̂1 ∈ Θ
2: Q1 ← x1xT1
3: for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
4: Define σt as the minimum eigenvalue of Qt.
5: Set
λt =
`M
6t
(1 +
t∑
`=1
σ`) . (23)
6: Set
ηt =
1
λt · t (24)
7: Set θ̂t+1 according to the following rule:
θ̂t+1 = ΠΘ(θ̂t − ηt∇`t(θ̂t)) (25)
with
`t(θ) = −I(yt = 1) log(1− F (pt − 〈xt, θ〉))− I(yt = −1) log(F (pt − 〈xt, θ〉)) (26)
8: Qt+1 ← ( tt+1)Qt + ( 1t+1)xt+1xTt+1
9: Set price pt+1 as
pt+1 ← g(〈xt+1, θ̂t+1〉) (27)
Lemma 4.3. Consider model (3) for the product market values and the stochastic features model
(Assumption 4.1). Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds and set M = 2W +ϕ−1(0), with ϕ being the
virtual valuation function w.r.t distribution F . Let {θ̂t}t≥1 be generated by PSGD pricing policy.
Then,
Cmin
T∑
t=1
E(‖θt − θ̂t‖2) ≤
[
128
`2M
+
24u2M
`2M
(
c˜+
4
Cmind
)]
· d3 log T
+ 8W 2d
(
1
T
+
12
`2M
+
1
c2d
)
+ 4W
T∑
t=1
tδt .
Here σmin denotes the minimum eigenvalue of covariance Σ. (See Assumption 4.1.)
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4.2 A lower bound on regret
In this section, we provide a theoretical lower bound on the minimum achievable regret of any
pricing policy under the stochastic features model. Prior to that, we need to adopt a few notations.
For a given time horizon T and a sequence of valuations parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θT ), let
Vθ(T ) ≡
T∑
t=1
t‖θt+1 − θt‖ . (29)
We also define, for ν ∈ [1/2, 2],
V(T,B, ν) ≡ {θ : θt ∈ Θ, Vθ(T ) ≤ BdT ν} . (30)
By assuming θ ∈ V(T,B, ν) for all T , we are assuming that nature has a finite temporal variation
budget to use in changing the valuation parameters throughout the time horizon. Of course, differ-
ent variation metrics can be considered such as total variation
∑T
t=1 δt or the maximum temporal
variation sup1≤t≤T δt and the performance of a pricing policy can be studied under different vari-
ation budget constraints. The specific choice of (29) is putting higher weights at later variations
in the sequence θ and is reasonable for applications where one expects the buyer’s preferences
(valuation parameters) become stable over time. Note that designing favorable pricing policy for
applications with gradual changes in buyer’s preferences is more challenging than that for environ-
ments with bursty changes. This might look counterintuitive at first glance because at any time,
the accumulated information about valuations can become useless by an abrupt change in the valu-
ation model. However, as noticed and analyzed in [KZ16], this is not that case because, intuitively,
gradual changes can be undetectable and lead to significant revenue loss, while for bursty changes,
the policy can be designed in a way to detect the changes and reset its estimate of the valuation
model after each change to avoid large estimation error and revenue loss. For a pricing policy pi,
consider the T -period regret, defined as
Regretpi(T,B, ν) ≡ max
{
∆piθ,Px(T ) : θ ∈ V(T,B, ν), Px ∈ Q
}
(31)
where we recall that
∆piθ,Px(T ) ≡
T∑
t=1
Eθ,Px
(
p∗t I(vt ≥ p∗t )− ptI(vt ≥ pt)
)
. (32)
Note that this is the same regret notion defined in (21), where we just make the variation budget
constraint explicit in the notation.
Rephrasing the statement of Theorem 4.2, for PSGD pricing policy we have Regretpi(T,B, ν) ≤
C1d
2 log T + C2BT
ν . We next provide a lower bound on the regret of any pricing policy. Indeed
this lower bound applies to a powerful clairvoyant who fully observes the market values after the
price is either accepted or rejected.
Theorem 4.4. Consider linear model (3) where the market values vt(xt), 1 ≤ t ≤ T , are fully
observed. We further assume that market value noises are generated as zt ∼ N(0, σ2). There exists
a constant c, depending on σ, Cmax, such that Regret
pi(T,B, ν) ≥ cmin
( (
B2dT 2ν−1
)1/3
, T/d
)
, for
any pricing policy pi and time horizon T .
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The high-level intuition behind this result is that the nature can change the valuation parameters
in a gradual manner such that the seller should pay a revenue loss in order to detect the changes
and learn the new valuation parameter after a change. To be more specific, we divide the time
horizon into cycles of length N periods, where N is of order (T 4−2ν/d)1/3 and consider a setting
where the value of θt can change to one of two options θ
0, θ1, only in the first period of a cycle. We
choose the parameter change δ = ‖θ1− θ0‖ of order √d/N to ensure that (i) no policy can identify
the change without incurring a revenue loss of order Nδ2/d (ii) The variation metric Vθ(T ) remains
below the allowable limit of BdT ν . Therefore, the total regret over T periods works out at Tδ2/d.
In particular, for proving point (i) we quantify the likelihood of valuations under the probability
measures corresponding to θ0 and θ1, using Kullback-Leibler divergence. We use Pinsker inequality
form probability theory and hypothesis testing results from information theory to show that there
is a significant probability of not detecting the (potential) change, which consequently yields a
revenue loss of order Nδ2/d, over each cycle.
We refer to Section 7.3 for the proof of Theorem 4.4.
5 Numerical experiments
We numerically study the performance of our PSGD pricing policy on synthetic data. In our
experiments, we set W = 5 and set θ1 = (W/2)(Z/‖Z‖), with Z ∼ N(0, Id) a multivariate normal
variable. We then generate a sequence of parameters θt as follows:
θt+1 = θt + rt ,
where rt = t
−b(Z˜/‖Z˜‖), with Z˜ ∼ N(0, Id). Note that δt = ‖θt+1 − θt‖ = ‖rt‖ = t−b.
Next, at each time t, product covariates xt are independently sampled from a Gaussian dis-
tribution N(0, Id) and normalized so that ‖xt‖ = 1. Further, the market shocks are generated as
zt ∼ N(0, σ2), with σ = 1. We run the PSGD pricing policy for stochastic features model.
Results. Figure 1 compares the cumulative regret (averaged over 80 trials) of the PSGD policy,
for b = 0.5, 1, 2, on the aforementioned synthetic data for T = 50, 000 steps. The shaded region
around each curve correspond to the 95% confidence interval across the 80 trials. As expected,
increase in b results in larger temporal variations and larger regret.
To better understand the behavior of regret for different values of b, we plotted the regret
bounds in various scales in Figure 2. For b = 0.5, we have Regret(T ) ∼ T 2/3, and for b = 1, 2, we
have Regret ∼ log(T ). Comparing with Theorem 4.2, we see that the empirical regret in case of
b = 0.5, 1, is smaller than the upper bound given by Equation (28), order-wise. However, it is worth
noting that bound given in Theorem 4.2 applies to any adversarial choice of temporal variations
rt, while in our experiments we generated these terms independently at random.
6 Extension to nonlinear model
Throughout the paper, we exclusively focused on linear models for buyer’s valuation with varying
coefficients. In order to generalize our results to nonlinear models, we consider a setting where the
market value of a product with feature vector xt is given by
vt(xt) = ψ(〈xt, θt〉+ zt) . (33)
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Figure 1: Cumulative regret of PSGD pricing policy for the synthetic data in Section 5. Temporal
variations are δt = t
−b and the curves are obtained by averaging across 80 trials. Shaded region
around each curve is the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2: Cumulative regrets of PSGD for different values of b. For b = 0.5, Regret(T ) ∼ T 2/3; for
b = 1, 2, Regret(T ) ∼ log(T ).
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This model is often referred to as generalized linear model and captures nonlinear dependencies
on features to some extent. We assume that the link function ψ : R 7→ R is a general log-concave
function and is strictly increasing.
We next compute the pricing function. Since ψ is strictly increasing, the expected revenue at a
price p amounts to p
(
1− F (ψ−1(p)− 〈xt, θt〉)). First order condition for the optimal price p∗t (xt)
reads as
ψ′(ψ−1(p∗t )) =
pf
(
ψ−1(p∗t )− 〈xt, θt〉
)
1− F (ψ−1(p∗t )− 〈xt, θt〉)
. (34)
Define λ(v) = f(v)/(1 − F (v)) the hazard rate function for distribution F , and let p˜ = ψ−1(p).
Writing (34) in terms of λ function, we get
〈xt, θt〉 = p˜∗t − λ−1
(
ψ′(p˜∗t )
ψ(p˜∗t )
)
. (35)
For real-valued v, define
g−1ψ (v) ≡ v − λ−1
(
ψ′(v)
ψ(v)
)
. (36)
Note that by log-concavity of 1 − F , the hazard function λ is increasing. Also, by log-concavity
of ψ, the term ddv logψ(v) = ψ
′(v)/ψ(v) is decreasing. Putting these together, we obtain that
−λ−1(ψ′(v)/ψ(v)) is increasing. Therefore, the right-hand side of (36) is strictly increasing and the
function gψ is well-defined. Invoking Equation (35), we derive the optimal price as
p∗t = ψ (gψ(〈xt, θt〉)) . (37)
As noted before, since ψ is increasing, at each period t, a sale happens if zt ≥ ψ−1(pt) − 〈xt, θt〉.
Hence, the log-likelihood function reads as
`t(θ) = −I(yt = 1) log
(
1− F (ψ−1(pt)− 〈xt, θ〉))− I(yt = −1) log (F (ψ−1(pt)− 〈xt, θ〉)) . (38)
In PSGD pricing policy, we run gradient step with this log-likelihood function and then set price
pt+1 at next step as pt+1 = ψ (gψ(〈xt+1, θt+1〉)).
The results on the regret of PSGD pricing policy carries over to the generalized linear model as
well. The analysis goes along the same lines and is omitted.
7 Proof of main theorems
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Lemma 7.1. Set M = 2W+ϕ−1(0), and for θ ∈ Θ define ut(θ) = pt−〈xt, θ〉, where pt = g(〈xt, θ̂t〉)
is the posted price at time t. Then |ut(θ)| ≤M for all t ≥ 1.
Define function h(;u) from R≥0 to R≥0 as
h(p;u) = p(1− F (p− u))
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This is the expected revenue at price p when the noiseless valuation is u, i.e., 〈xt, θt〉 = u. We let
Rt ≡ p∗t I(vt ≥ p∗t )− ptI(vt ≥ pt) (39)
be the regret incurred at time t, and define Ft as the history up to time t (Formally, Ft is the
σ-algebra generated by market noise {z`}t`=1.) Then,
E(Rt|Ft−1) = p∗tP(vt ≥ p∗t )− ptP(vt ≥ pt) = h(p∗t ; 〈xt, θt〉)− h(pt; 〈xt, θ̂t〉) . (40)
The optimal price p∗t is the maximizer of h(p; 〈xt, θt〉) and thus h′(p∗t ; 〈xt, θt〉) = 0. By Taylor
expansion of function h, there exists a value p between pt and p
∗
t , such that,
h(pt; 〈xt, θt〉)− h(p∗t ; 〈xt, θt〉) =
1
2
h′′(p; 〈xt, θt〉)(pt − p∗t )2 . (41)
We next show that |h′′(p; 〈xt, θt〉)| ≤ C with C = 2B + MB′. Recall that B = maxv f(v) and
B′ = maxv f ′(v). To see this, we write
|h′′(p; 〈xt, θt〉)| =
∣∣∣2f(p− 〈xt, θt〉) + pf ′(p− 〈xt, θt〉)∣∣∣ ≤ 2B +MB′ . (42)
Putting Equations (39), (41), (42) and using the 1-Lipschitz property of price function g, we
conclude:
E[Rt|Ft−1] = h(p∗t ; 〈xt, θt〉)− h(pt; 〈xt, θ̂t〉) ≤
2B +MB′
2
(pt − p∗t )2
=
2B +MB′
2
(
g(〈xt, θ̂t〉)− g(〈xt, θt〉)
)2 ≤ 2B +MB′
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 (43)
To ease the presentation, define the shorthand
A(T ) ≡ 4
`M
max
{
16
`M
log T,
2W 2
ηT+1
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
}
.
We further let G be the probabilistic event that ∑Tt=1〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 ≤ A(T ). Employing Lemma 3.2
and using the fact that ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 ≤ 4W 2, we obtain that P(G) ≥ 1− 1T 2 .
We continue by bounding E(Rt) as follows:
E[Rt] = E[E[Rt|Ft−1]] = E
[
E[Rt|Ft−1] ·
(
I(G) + I(Gc)
)]
=
2B +MB′
2
E
[
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 · I(G)
]
+MP(Gc) .
Consequently,
Regret(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
E[Rt] ≤ 2B +MB
′
2
E
[ T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 · I(G)
]
+MT P(Gc) ≤ 2B +MB
′
2
A(T ) +
M
T
.
The proof is complete.
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7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.2 follows along the same lines as proof of Theorem 3.1. Let F˜t be the σ-algebra
generated by market noises {z`}t`=1 and feature vectors {x`}t`=1. Further, let Ft be the σ-algebra
generated by F˜t ∪ {xt+1}. For term Rt defined by (39) and following the chain of inequalities as
in (43),
E[Rt|Ft−1] ≤ 2B +MB
′
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 . (44)
For brevity in notation, let B¯ = (2B +MB′)/2. Since, Ft ⊇ F˜t, by iterated law of iteration,
E(Rt|F˜t−1) = E(E(Rt|Ft−1)|F˜t−1) ≤ B¯〈θt − θ̂t,Σ(θt − θ̂t)〉 ≤ 1
d
B¯Cmax‖θt − θ̂t‖2 (45)
Applying Lemma 4.3, we get
Regret(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
E[Rt] ≤ 1
d
B¯Cmax
T∑
t=1
E(‖θt − θ̂t‖2)
≤ B¯Cmax
Cmin
[
128
`2M
+
24u2M
`2M
(
c˜+
4
Cmind
)]
· d2 log T
+ 8W 2B¯
Cmax
Cmin
(
1
T
+
12
`2M
+
1
c2d
)
+ B¯
Cmax
Cmin
(4W
d
) T∑
t=1
tδt .
The result follows by taking
C1 = B¯
Cmax
Cmin
[
8W 2
(
1
T
+
12
`2M
+
1
c2d
)
+
128
`2M
+
24u2M
`2M
(
c˜+
4
Cmind
)]
,
C2 = 4WB¯
Cmax
Cmin
.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4.4
The proof methodology is similar to the proof of [KZ16, Theorem 1].
We first propose a setting for constructing the sequence of valuation parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θT ).
Divide the time horizon into cycles of length N = dm0T (4−2ν)/3e, where m0 = ( σ2CmaxB2d)1/3.
Consider a setting wherein the noise markets are generated as zt ∼ N(0, σ2) and the value of θt can
change only in the first period of a cycle, taking one of the two values {θ0, θ1}. Here, θ0, θ1 ∈ Rd
are two arbitrary vectors such that ‖θ0 − θ1‖ = δ, with δ = min(σ√d/(CmaxN),√c2). Note that
for this sequence of θ, we have
Vθ(T ) ≤
dT/Ne∑
k=1
(kN)δ ≤ T
2
N
δ ≤ BdT ν (46)
We consider a clairvoyant who fully observes the market values vt(xt). Focus on a single cycle
and let Ppi0 (resp. Ppi1 ) denote the probability distribution of valuations (v1, v2, . . . , vN ) when all the
17
parameters θt are equal to θ
0 (resp. θ1), for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . The KL divergence between Ppi0 and Ppi1
amounts to
DKL(Ppi0 ,Ppi1 ) ≡ Epi0 log

∏N
t=1 φ
(
vt − 〈xt, θ0〉
σ
)
∏N
t=1 φ
(
vt − 〈xt, θ1〉
σ
)
 (47)
where Epi0 denotes expectation w.r.t Ppi0 and φ(s) = 1/(
√
2pi)e−s2/2 is the standard Gaussian density.
After simple algebraic manipulation, we obtain
DKL(Ppi0 ,Ppi1 ) = −
1
2σ2
Epi0
{ N∑
t=1
(2zt − 〈xt, θ1 − θ0〉)〈xt, θ1 − θ0〉
}
=
1
2σ2
N∑
t=1
Epi0 (〈xt, θ1 − θ0〉2) ≤
1
2σ2d
N∑
t=1
Cmax‖θ1 − θ0‖2
=
1
2σ2
Cmax
δ2N
d
.
We next relate the expected regret to the KL divergence between Ppi0 and Ppi1 .
Lemma 7.2. Let Rt be the regret incurred at time t, defined as Rt ≡ p∗t I(vt ≥ p∗t ) − ptI(vt ≥ pt).
Then, there exist constants c1, c2 depending on σ, W , and Cmin, such that
E(Rt) ≥ c1
d
E
{
min
(
‖θ̂t − θt‖22, c2
)}
. (48)
Proof of Lemma 7.2 goes along the proof of [JN16, Equation (55)] and is omitted.
By applying Lemma 7.2, we have
∆piθ,Px(N) =
N∑
t=1
Eθ(Rt) ≥ c1
d
N∑
t=1
E
{
min
(
‖θ̂t − θt‖22, c2
)}
. (49)
For brevity in notations, for the sequence θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ), we define da(θ) = c1
∑N
t=1 min(‖θt−
θa‖22, c2), for a = 1, 2. Define two sets Ja, for a = 1, 2 as follows:
Ja =
{
θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ) : θi ∈ Rd , da(θ) < 1
4
Nδ2
}
. (50)
Then,
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max
(
∆pi0,Px(N),∆
pi
1,Px(N)
) ≥ 1
d
max
(
Epi0 (d0(θ)),Epi1 (d1(θ))
)
≥ N
4d
δ2 max
(
Ppi0 (θ /∈ J0),Ppi1 (θ /∈ J1)
)
(a)
≥ N
4d
δ2 max
(
Ppi0 (θ /∈ J0),Ppi1 (θ ∈ J0)
)
≥ N
8d
δ2
(
Ppi0 (θ /∈ J0) + Ppi1 (θ ∈ J0)
)
≥ N
8d
δ2
(
1− Ppi0 (θ ∈ J0) + Ppi1 (θ ∈ J0)
)
≥ N
8d
δ2
(
1−
√
1
2
DKL(Ppi0 ,Ppi1 )
)
(By Pinsker inequality)
≥ N
8d
δ2
(
1− 1
2σ
δ
√
Cmax
N
d
)
≥ Nδ
2
16d
.
Here (a) holds because θ ∈ J0 implies θ /∈ J1. Otherwise, d0(θ) < Nδ2/4 and d1(θ) < Nδ2/4.
Using the inequality min(a + b, c) ≤ min(a, c) + min(b, c) for a, b, c ≥ 0, and applying triangle
inequality, we get
N min(‖θ0 − θ1‖2, c2) ≤ 2d0(θ) + 2d1(θ) < Nδ2 , (51)
which is a contradiction because δ2 = ‖θ0 − θ1‖2 ≤ c2. Therefore, we conclude that
Regretpi(T,B, ν) ≥
⌊ T
N
⌋
max
(
∆pi0,Px(N),∆
pi
1,Px(N)
)
≥ Tδ
2
16d
=
T
16
min
( σ2
CmaxN
,
c2
d
)
=
1
16
min
{( σ2
Cmax
)2/3
(B2dT 2ν−1)1/3,
c2T
d
}
. (52)
The result follows.
8 Proof of main lemmas
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
We prove Lemma 3.2 by developing an upper bound and a lower bound for the quantity
∑T
t=1 `t(θ̂t)−∑T
t=1 `t(θt). The result follows by combining these two bounds.
Lemma 8.1 (Upper bound). Suppose {θt}t≥1 is an arbitrary sequence in Θ, and ‖θ‖ ≤ W for all
θ ∈ Θ. Set M = 2W + ϕ−1(0), with ϕ being the virtual valuation function w.r.t distribution F .
Further, let {θ̂t}t≥1 be generated by PSGD policy using a non-increasing positive series ηt+1 ≤ ηt.
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Then
T∑
t=1
`t(θ̂t)−
T∑
t=1
`t(θt) ≤2W
2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
( 1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
− `M
2
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 , (53)
where δt ≡ ‖θt+1 − θt‖ and we recall uM from Equation (15).
The proof of Lemma 8.1 uses similar ideas to the regret bounds established in [HW15], but uses
the log-concavity of F and 1− F and also definition of uM and `M as per Equations (15) and (16)
to get a more refined bound including quadratic terms 〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2. We refer to Appendix B for
the proof of Lemma 8.1.
Our next Lemma provides a probabilistic lower bound on
∑T
t=1 `t(θ̂t)−
∑T
t=1 `t(θt).
Lemma 8.2 (Lower bound). Consider model (3) for the product market values and suppose As-
sumption 2.1 holds. Let {θ̂t}t≥1 be an arbitrary sequence in Θ. Then with probability at least 1− 1T 2
the following holds true
T∑
t=1
`t(θ̂t)−
T∑
t=1
`t(θt) ≥ −2
√
log T
{ T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
}1/2
. (54)
Proof of Lemma 8.2 is given in Appendix C. It uses convexity of `t(θ̂) and an application of a
concentration bound on martingale difference sequences.
Combining Equations (53) and (54) we obtain that with probability at least 1− 1
T 2
the following
holds true
−2
√
log T
{ T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
}1/2 ≤2W 2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
( 1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
− `M
2
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 (55)
Rearranging the terms, we get
`M
2
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 − 2
√
log T
{ T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
}1/2
≤ 2W
2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
( 1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 + u
2
M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
(56)
Define A ≡∑Tt=1〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 and denote by B the right-hand side of Equation (56).
Writing in terms of A and B, we have
A− 4
`M
√
A log T ≤ 2B
`M
. (57)
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We next upper bound A as follows. Consider two cases:
Case 1: Assume that √
A log T ≤ `M
8
A .
Using this in Equation (57), we get A ≤ 4B/`M .
Case 2: Assume that √
A log T >
`M
8
A .
Then, A < (64/`2M ) log T .
Combining the above two cases, we obtain
A ≤ 4
`M
max
( 16
`M
log T,B
)
.
Substituting for A and B, we have
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 ≤ 4
`M
max
{
16
`M
log T,
2W 2
η1
+
T∑
t=1
( 1
2ηt+1
− 1
2ηt
)
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 + u
2
M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
}
The proof is complete.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proposition 8.3. Let σt denote the minimum eigenvalue of Qt ≡ (1/t)
∑t
`=1 x`x
T
` . Further, let
σmin be the minimum eigenvalue of Σ, where Σ is the population covariance of feature vectors as
in Assumption 4.1. Then, there exist constants c1, c2 > 0, such that
∀t ≥ c1d : P
(1
2
σmin ≤ σt ≤ 3
2
σmin
)
≥ 1− 2e−c2t/d . (58)
Further, σt ≤ 1, for all t ≥ 1.
Let Ft be the σ algebra generated by market shocks {z`}t`=1 and features {x`}t`=1. We further
define Dt = 〈xt, θ̂t− θt〉2−‖Σ1/2(θ̂t− θt)‖2. Note that θ̂t is Ft−1 measurable and xt is independent
of Ft−1, which implies E(Dt|Ft−1) = 0. Hence, E(Dt) = 0 by iterated law of expectation and
therefore
∑T
t=1 E(Dt) = 0. Equivalently,
E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2
]
=
T∑
t=1
E
[
‖Σ1/2(θ̂t − θt)‖2
]
≥ σmin E
[
T∑
t=1
‖θ̂t − θt‖2
]
(59)
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Define GT the event that bound (19) holds true. Then,
E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2 · (IG + IGc)
]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2 · IG
]
+ 4W 2T P(Gc)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2 · IG
]
+
4W 2
T
. (60)
Further, using inequality max(a, b) ≤ |a|+ |b|, we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2 · IG
]
≤ 4
`M
{
16
`M
log T +
12W 2
`M
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
E
[(
(t+ 1)λt+1 − tλt
)
· ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
]
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
E
[
1
tλt
]
+ 2W
T∑
t=1
E[tλt]δt
}
. (61)
We next bound the terms on the right-hand side individually.
T∑
t=1
E
[(
(t+ 1)λt+1 − tλt
)
· ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
]
≤ `M
6
T∑
t=1
E
[
σt+1 · ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
]
≤ `M
6
T∑
t=1
E
[
σt+1‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 I(σt+1 < 3σmin/2)
]
+
`M
6
T∑
t=1
E
[
σt+1 ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 I(σt+1 > 3σmin/2)
]
≤ `M
4
σmin
T∑
t=1
E
(
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
)
+
T∑
t=1
2`MW
2e−c2t/d
≤ `M
4
σmin
T∑
t=1
E
(
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
)
+
2`M
c2d
W 2 , (62)
where in the last inequality, we used P(σt+1 > 3σmin/2) ≤ 2e−c2dt, σt ≤ 1 and ‖θ̂t − θt‖ ≤ 2W ,
according to Proposition 8.3.
The next term on the right-hand side of (61) is bounded in the following proposition.
Proposition 8.4. Using rule (23) for λt, we have
E
[
1
tλt
]
≤ 6
`M
(
c˜d2 log T +
4d
Cmin
log T
)
, (63)
where c˜ = max(c1, 1/c2) and constants c1 and c2 are defined in Proposition 8.3 .
Finally, for the last term, we note that Qt is rank deficient for t ≤ d and hence σt = 0, for
1 ≤ t ≤ d. Further, the minimum eigenvalue of a matrix is a concave function over PSD matrices.
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By Jensen inequality, we have
E(λt) =
`M
6t
(1 +
t∑
`=1
E(σ`)) =
`M
6t
(
1 +
t∑
`=d+1
E(σ`)
)
≤ `M
6t
(
1 +
t∑
`=d+1
σmin
)
≤ `M
6t
(
1 +
t− d
d
)
=
`M
6d
. (64)
In the last inequality, we used the fact that Trace(Σ) = E(‖xt‖2) = 1, and thus σmin ≤ 1/d. Hence,
T∑
t=1
E[tλt]δt ≤ `M
6d
T∑
t=1
tδt , (65)
Using Equations (62), (63), (65) to bound the right-hand side of (61), we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θ̂t − θt〉2 · IG
]
≤
[
64
`2M
+
12u2M
`2M
(
c˜+
4
Cmind
)]
· d2 log T
+
48W 2
`2M
+
4W 2
c2d
+
2W
d
T∑
t=1
tδt +
σmin
2
T∑
t=1
E(‖θt − θ̂t‖2) . (66)
Combining bounds (59),(60) and (65), we obtain
σmin
2
T∑
t=1
E(‖θt − θ̂t‖2) ≤
[
64
`2M
+
12u2M
`2M
(
c˜+
4
Cmind
)]
· d2 log T
+ 4W 2
(
1
T
+
12
`2M
+
1
c2d
)
+
2W
d
T∑
t=1
tδt .
The result follows by recalling that σmin ≥ Cmin/d as stated by Assumption 4.1.
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A Proof of Lemma 7.1
We first state some properties of the the virtual valuation function ϕ and the price function g, given
by Equation (7).
Proposition A.1. If 1−F is log-concave, then the virtual valuation function ϕ is strictly monotone
increasing and the price function g satisfies 0 < g′(v) < 1, for all values of v ∈ R.
We refer to [JN16] (Lemmas 1 and 2 in Appendix A therein) for a proof of Proposition A.1.
For θ ∈ Θ we have ‖θ‖ ≤ W and hence |〈xt, θ〉| ≤ ‖xt‖‖θ‖ ≤ W for all t. Applying Proposi-
tion A.1 (1-Lipschitz property of g),
pt = g(〈xt, θt〉) ≤ g(0) + |〈xt, θt〉| ≤ ϕ−1(0) +W .
Therefore,
|ut(θ)| ≤ |pt|+ |〈xt, θ〉| ≤ ϕ−1(0) + 2W . (67)
B Proof of Lemma 8.1
We note that the update rule (25) can be recast as θ̂t+1 = arg minθ∈Θ Ct(θ), where
Ct(θ) = ηt〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ〉+ 1
2
‖θ − θ̂t‖2 .
By convexity of Ct and optimality of θ̂t+1, we have 〈θ − θ̂t+1,∇Ct(θ̂t+1)〉 ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Setting
θ = θt,
〈θt − θ̂t+1, ηt∇`t(θ̂t) + θ̂t+1 − θ̂t〉 ≥ 0 . (68)
Expanding `t(θ) around θ̂t, we have
`t(θ̂t)− `(θt) = 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θt〉 − 1
2
〈θt − θ̂t,∇2`t(θ˜)(θt − θ̂t)〉 , (69)
for some θ˜ on the line segment between θ˜t and θ̂t. Recalling (26), the gradient and the hessian of
`t read as
∇`t(θ) = µt(θ)xt , ∇2`t(θ) = ηt(θ)xtxTt , (70)
with,
µt(θ) = − f(ut(θ))
F (ut(θ))
I(yt = −1) + f(ut(θ))
1− F (ut(θ))I(yt = +1)
= − d
dx
logF (ut(θ))I(yt = −1)− d
dx
log(1− F (ut(θ)))I(yt = +1) (71)
ηt(θ) =
(
f(ut(θ))
2
F (ut(θ))2
− f
′(ut(θ))
F (ut(θ))
)
I(yt = −1) +
(
f(ut(θ))
2
(1− F (ut(θ)))2 +
f ′(ut(θ))
1− F (ut(θ))
)
I(yt = +1)
= − d
2
dx2
logF (ut(θ))I(yt = −1)− d
2
dx2
log(1− F (ut(θ)))I(yt = +1) . (72)
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Here, ut(θ) = pt − 〈xt, θ〉, and ddx logF (x) and d
2
dx2
logF (x) represent first and second derivative
w.r.t x, respectively. In addition, using Equation (73)
|ut(θ)| ≤ ϕ−1(0) + 2W = M , ∀θ ∈ Θ . (73)
Hence, invoking the definition of `M , as per Equation (16), we get that ηt(θ) ≥ `M and hence
∇2`t(θ˜)  `MxtxTt .
Continuing from Equation (69), we get
`t(θ̂t)− `(θt) ≤ 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θt〉 − `M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
= 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t+1 − θt〉+ 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θ̂t+1〉 − `M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
≤ 1
ηt
〈θt − θ̂t+1, θ̂t+1 − θ̂t〉+ 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θ̂t+1〉 − `M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
=
1
2ηt
{
‖θt − θ̂t‖2 − ‖θt − θ̂t+1‖2 − ‖θ̂t+1 − θ̂t‖2
}
+ 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θ̂t+1〉 − `M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
=
1
2ηt
{
‖θt − θ̂t‖2 − ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
}
+
1
2ηt
{
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 − ‖θt − θ̂t+1‖2
}
− 1
2ηt
‖θ̂t+1 − θ̂t‖2 + 〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θ̂t+1〉 − `M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 (74)
We next note that the second term above can be bounded as
1
2ηt
{
‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2 − ‖θt − θ̂t+1‖2
}
=
1
ηt
〈θt+1 − θ̂t+1, θt+1 − θt〉 ≤ 2
ηt
Wδt , (75)
because θt+1, θ̂t+1 ∈ Θ and hence ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖ ≤ 2W by triangle inequality.
Further,
〈∇`t(θ̂t), θ̂t − θ̂t+1〉 ≤ 1
2ηt
‖θ̂t+1 − θ̂t‖2 + ηt
2
‖∇`t(θ̂t)‖2
≤ 1
2ηt
‖θ̂t+1 − θ̂t‖2 + ηt
2
|µ(θ̂t)|2‖xt‖2 ≤ 1
2ηt
‖θ̂t+1 − θ̂t‖2 + ηt
2
u2M , (76)
where we used the inequality 2ab ≤ a2 + b2 and the characterization of gradient (70). Note that
by (73), |ut(θ̂)| ≤M and by definition (15), |µt(θ̂t)| ≤ uM . Plugging in bounds from (75) and (76)
in Equation (74), we arrive at
`t(θ̂t)− `(θt) ≤ 1
2ηt
{
‖θt − θ̂t‖2 − ‖θt+1 − θ̂t+1‖2
}
+
2
ηt
Wδt +
ηt
2
u2M −
`M
2
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 (77)
We use the shorthand Dt =
1
2‖θt− θ̂t‖2. The result follows by summing the above bound over time:
T∑
t=1
`t(θ̂t)−
T∑
t=1
`t(θt) =
T∑
t=1
(Dt
ηt
− Dt+1
ηt+1
)
+
T∑
t=1
Dt+1
( 1
ηt+1
− 1
ηt
)
+
u2M
2
T∑
t=1
ηt + 2W
T∑
t=1
δt
ηt
− `M
2
T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2 .
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The proof is concluded because D1 ≤ 2W 2 as θ̂1, θ1 ∈ Θ; therefore
T∑
t=1
(Dt
ηt
− Dt+1
ηt+1
)
=
D1
η1
− DT+1
ηT+1
≤ D1
η1
≤ 2W
2
η1
.
C Proof of Lemma 8.2
By convexity of `t(θ), we have
`t(θt)− `t(θ̂t) ≤ 〈∇`t(θt), θ̂t − θt〉 = µt(θt)〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉 . (78)
We denote Dt = µt(θt)〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉 and let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by {zt}Tt=1. Since θ̂t is
Ft−1 measurable, we have
E(Dt|Ft−1) = E(µt(θt)|Ft−1)〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉 = 0 , (79)
where E(µt(θt)|Ft−1) = 0 follows readily from Equation (71). Therefore, D(T ) ≡
∑T
t=1Dt is a
martingale adapted to the filtration Ft.
We next bound E[eλDt |Ft−1] for any λ ∈ R. Conditional on Ft−1, we have |Dt| ≤ βt, with
βt ≡ uM |〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉|. Since eλz is convex,
E[eλDt |Ft−1] ≤ E
[
βt −Dt
2βt
e−λβt +
βt +Dt
2βt
eλβt
∣∣∣∣Ft−1]
= E
[
e−λβt + eλβt
2
]
+ E[Dt|Ft−1]
(
e−λβt + eλβt
2βt
)
= cosh(λβt) ≤ eλ2β2t /2 . (80)
We are now ready to apply the following Bernstein-type concentration bound for martingale differ-
ence sequences, whose proof is given in Appendix D for the reader’s convenience.
Proposition C.1. Consider a martingale difference sequence Dt adapted to a filtration Ft, such
that for any λ ≥ 0, E[eλDt |Ft−1] ≤ eλ2σ2t /2 . Then, for D(T ) =
∑T
t=1Dt, the following holds true:
P(D(T ) ≥ ξ) ≤ e−ξ2/(2
∑T
t=1 σ
2
t ) . (81)
Combining Equation (78) and the result of Proposition C.1 we obtain
P
( T∑
t=1
`t(θ̂t)−
T∑
t=1
`t(θt) ≤ −2
√
log T
{ T∑
t=1
〈xt, θt − θ̂t〉2
}1/2) ≤ 1
T 2
. (82)
The result follows.
D Proof of Proposition C.1
We follow the standard approach of controlling the moment generating function ofD(T ).Conditioning
on Ft−1 and applying iterated expectation yields
E[eλD(T )] = E
[
eλ
∑T−1
t=1 Dt · E[eλDT |FT−1]
]
≤ E
[
eλ
∑T−1
t=1 Dt
]
eλ
2σ2T /2 . (83)
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Iterating this procedure gives the bound E[eλ
∑T
t=1Dt ] ≤ eλ2
∑T
t=1 σ
2
t /2, for all λ ≥ 0.
Now by applying the exponential Markov inequality we get
P(D(T ) ≥ ξ) = P(eλD(T ) ≥ eλξ) ≤ e−λξE[eλ
∑T
t=1Dt ] ≤ e−λξeλ2(
∑T
t=1 σ
2
t )/2 . (84)
Choosing λ = ξ/(
∑T
t=1 σ
2
t ) gives the desired result.
E Proof of Proposition 8.3
We prove the result in a more general case, namely when the features are independent random
vectors with bounded subgaussian norms.
Definition E.1. For a random variable z, its subgaussian norm, denoted by ‖z‖ψ2 is defined as
‖z‖ψ2 = sup
p≥1
p−1/2(E|z|p)1/p . (85)
Further, for a random vector z its subgaussian norm is defined as
‖z‖ψ2 = sup
‖u‖≥1
‖〈z, u〉‖ψ2 . (86)
We next recall the following result from [Ver12] about random matrices with independent rows.
Proposition E.2. Suppose x` ∈ Rd are independent random vectors generated from a distri-
bution with covariance Σ and their subgaussian norms are bounded by K. Further, let Qt =
(1/t)
∑t
`=1 x`x
T
` . Then for every s ≥ 0, the following inequality holds with probability at least
1− 2 exp(−cs2): ∥∥∥Qt − Σ∥∥∥ ≤ max(δ, δ2) where δ = C√d
t
+
s√
t
. (87)
Here C and c > 0 are constants that depend solely on K.
We next show that the feature vectors in our problem have bounded subgaussian norm. Given
that ‖x`‖ ≤ 1, for ‖u‖ ≤ 1, we have
‖〈x`, u〉‖ψ2 = sup
p≥1
p−1/2(E|〈x`, u〉|p)1/p ≤ sup
p≥1
p−1/2(E[‖x`‖‖u‖]p)1/p ≤ 1 .
Applying Proposition (E.2) with K = 1, there exist constants c1, c2 (depending on Cmin), such
that for t ≥ c1d2, we have
‖Qt − Σ‖ ≤ 1
2d
Cmin ≤ 1
2
σmin , (88)
with probability at least 1− 2e−c2t/d. Weyl’s inequality then implies that |σt − σmin| ≤ σmin/2.
Also note that for t ≥ 1,
σt ≤ ‖Qt‖ ≤ 1
t
t∑
`=1
‖x`xT` ‖ =
1
t
t∑
`=1
‖x`‖2 = 1 .
The proof is complete.
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F Proof of Lemma 8.4
The way we set λt (see Equation (23)), we have
1
tλt
=
(
6
`M
)
1
1 + σ1 + σ2 + . . .+ σt
Clearly, for t ≥ 1, 1/(tλt) ≤ 6/`M . Let t0 = c˜d2 log T , with c˜ = max(c1, 1/c2). For T ≥ t0,
define the event ET as follows
ET = {σt ≥ σmin/2, for t0 ≤ t ≤ T} . (89)
By applying Proposition 8.3 and union bounding over t, we get
P(ET ) ≥ 1−
T∑
t=t0
2e−c2t/d ≥ 1− 2d
c2
e−c2t0/d (90)
Therefore,
T∑
t=t0
E
[
1
tλ
]
≤ E
[(
T∑
t=t0
1
tλ
)
I(ET )
]
+
6T
`M
P(EcT )
=
6
`M
E
[(
T∑
t=t0
1
1 + σ1 + . . .+ σt
)
· I(ET )
]
+
6T
`M
P(EcT )
≤ 6
`M
(
T∑
t=1
1
1 + t2σmin
+
2d
c2
T 1−c2c˜d
)
≤ 12
`M
(
1
σmin
log T +
d
c2
T 1−d
)
≤ 24d
`MCmin
log T . (91)
For t ≥ 1, we use the bound 1/(tλt) ≤ 6/`M . Hence,
T∑
t=1
E
[
1
tλ
]
≤ 6
`M
(
t0 +
4d
Cmin
log T
)
≤ 6
`M
(
c˜d2 log T +
4d
Cmin
log T
)
(92)
The proof is complete.
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